By: Fred Jankilevich – Attorney At Law
All rights Reserved. May 2019
The present article deals with the present efficiency of the EPA to measure clean air. The complexity of curtailing air pollution is historically varied. The present legislation is oriented towards limiting global warming nationally and internationally. To measure clean air, the EPA currently uses three primary ecological factors: Temperature, atmospheric conditions and air conditions. Additionally, the EPA uses as a standard of measure “sources of Air Pollutants” weighted against the standards stipulated under the Clean Air Act.
The prevailing judicial problems surrounding the proficiency of EPA and clean air are largely Constitutional. Dominant constitutional obstacles surrounding clean air, include but are not limited to: Federal government and state divisions, deliberate systemic fragmentation of the legal system, incremental legal difficulty of the legislative process and prevailing difficulties for the enactment of environmental laws (Zdeb S.: Environmental Law & Politics: 2018).
Under this light, the Supreme Court Ruling of EPA v. EME Homer City Generation is reviewed.
The Clean Air Act directs EPA to establish national ambient air quality standards. The inference rendered by the Court pertaining 42 U.S.C. Sections 7408 and 7409 are completely transparent. The protections rendered by the fundamental right of citizens to protect public health is precisely phrased. Additionally, each State must submit a State Implementation Plan within three years. Therefore, aspects pertaining Section 7407(d) and Section 7410(a)(1) for the submission of a State Implementation Plan is least transparent. In this sense, the legal variance from State to State and the conflicts between State and Federal Law may render ambiguity and overbroad interpretations of the text. The Interpretation of the Good Neighbour’s Provision scope is also similarly transparent. Thus, a precise construction of the provision exists, but an intermediate level of ambiguity exists that may ensue in a formal revision of the text.
In general terms, the D.C. Circuit, as per the rulings initially pondered valuation about the matter, amended by emplacing the Clean Air Interstate rule. This permitted a formal interpretation of the legislative text whereby, as per the formal publication, the E.P.A. is “encouraged” to act with dispatch ‘in dealing with problems identified by the Court.’ (U.S.C.: 12-1182-553). Thus, the Transport Rule in the D.C. Circuit may be perceived as constituent of a similarly transparent formal construction, whereby the former is linguistically challenged by the latter. In this sense, the publication of the D.C. circuit rulings resulted in the challenge of the D.C. Circuit Transport rule both in terms of form and style. As a result thereof, alleging that “EPA’s actions exceeded the Agency’s statutory authority (…)” “(…) in two respects.” The first one constitutes acknowledgement of the EPA’s FIP authority as generally triggered by the disproval of an Agency SIP. The second one, the conclusion of the court that the EPA must give States a “reasonable opportunity” to allocate emission budgets “before the issuing FIP’s.” (Ibid.) In this sense, under Justice Stone’s interpretation, the central role of the opinion is amended, and an ultimate work product is forged. Therefore, the revised holdings of the D.C. circuit were an ample opportunity for close scrutiny invited by revision. (Ginsburg J.: October: 2013)